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The number of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) has grown dra-
matically over the last decade or so. By the end of March 2002, there were
250 agreements in force that had been notiﬁed to the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO), compared with 40 in 1990 (WTO 2002).
The coverage of preferential trading arrangements has also tended to
expand over time. The preferential liberalization of tariﬀs and other mea-
sures governing merchandise trade remains important in many agreements.
But they increasingly cover a range of other issues—services, investment,
competition policy, government procurement, e-commerce, labor, and en-
vironmental standards.
This paper examines, both theoretically and empirically, the eﬀects of
the trade and nontrade provisions of PTAs on the trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI) ﬂows of member and nonmember countries.
5.1 Theoretical Review
The ﬁrst wave of PTAs in the 1950s to 1970s were generally limited in
scope, with preferential liberalization of merchandise trade playing a cen-
tral role (the European Union [EU] was an important early exception). In
part, this was because general tariﬀ levels were higher to start with.
The static analysis of ﬁrst-wave PTAs challenged the presumption that
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with which they have been aﬃliated.these were a step in the right direction.1 It concluded that although PTAs
eased one economic distortion, namely, the average tariﬀ on imports in
general, they exacerbated another, namely, the geographical disparity in
import tariﬀs. This was a classic situation of second best, with no clear pre-
sumption in favor of gains to either PTA members or the world as a whole.
The answer “depends,” and the devil is in the detail. The analysis is sum-
marized in the appendix, using a diagrammatic exposition similar to that
ﬁrst developed by Johnson (1960).
The literature also recognized that if the answer depends, then the ques-
tion is an empirical one. Various analysts examined the trade eﬀects of
various PTAs, trying to determine whether they have encouraged imports
in general—trade creation—more than they have pushed the geographic
source of imports in the wrong direction—trade diversion. There is a de-
gree of apparent consensus (summarized later) about which PTAs have
been beneﬁcial and which have been harmful to members. There have also
been recent generalizations that PTAs are relatively benign.
Interest in PTAs revived early in the 1980s as the United States reacted
ﬁrst to EU expansionism and the loss of EU markets and then to the un-
certain prospects for launching the Uruguay Round, by selecting partners
for bilateral and regional trade arrangements. The second-wave agree-
ments were predominantly free trade agreements, where members retained
their own external tariﬀs, as opposed to customs unions, which adopt a
common external tariﬀ. Hence rules of origin became important to prevent
trade deﬂection, whereby imports would enter through the country with
the lowest external tariﬀ. The second wave of PTAs also saw the inclusion
of nontariﬀ barriers and other nontraditional areas, such as dispute reso-
lution and competition policy. However, the sectoral focus remained on
goods markets.
With the second wave, the focus of theoretical work shifted to the dy-
namic question of whether PTAs were “building blocks” or “stumbling
blocks” to multilateral free trade. Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya
(1999) identiﬁed two distinct approaches. First, suppose a PTA expands its
membership. Will that reduce or increase welfare? If expansion increases
welfare, then PTAs are seen as building blocks. Second, will a PTA expand
its membership? And if so, is there an incentive for expansion to eventually
cover the entire world, with nondiscriminatory free trade for all, or will it
stop short? This approach uses political economy considerations.
Some partial answers to these questions were provided by Krugman
(1993), Deardorﬀ and Stern (1994), Baldwin, (1996), Levy (1997), and
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1. The seminal work is Viner (1950). Other early contributions came from Gehrels (1957),
Lipsey (1957, 1958), Johnson (1960), Mundell (1964), Corden (1972), and Riezman (1979).
Comprehensive surveys of the literature are available in Baldwin and Venables (1995), Pom-
fret (1997), Bhagwati, Krishna, and Panagariya (1999), and Panagariya (2000), among oth-
ers. Two recent policy-oriented reviews are by the WTO (1995) and the World Bank (2000).Krishna (1998). The most recent, comprehensive analyses by Zissimos and
Vines (2000) and Andriamananjara (2002) acknowledge that joining a
PTA is the best safe-haven strategy when other countries are doing so. But
they ﬁnd that because PTA membership confers a terms of trade gain to
members at the expense of nonmembers, at least some members will be
better oﬀ limiting PTA membership than allowing expansion to cover the
world as a whole.2 Any redesign of the WTO rules disciplining the forma-
tion of PTAs would need to recognize that reality.
During the 1990s the number of PTAs expanded dramatically. In addi-
tion to new preferential initiatives by the EU and the United States, the
third wave now includes players such as Japan. Until 2002 Japan was one
of only four WTO members not to participate in any PTA (although it was
a member of nondiscriminatory Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation
[APEC]). Its ﬁrst agreement, the Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement
for a New Age Partnership, typiﬁes many new age agreements. The provi-
sions governing merchandise trade are very limited. Both countries already
have zero or very low tariﬀs on imports of nonagricultural products, and
trade in agricultural products between them is minimal, but because of the
sensitivity of the trade in cut ﬂowers and goldﬁsh, agricultural and ﬁshery
products (along with some petrochemical and petroleum goods) have been
excluded from the bilateral agreement altogether. Instead, the agreement
focuses on new age issues—especially e-commerce and services. Other
such agreements include FDI, competition policy, government procure-
ment, labor, and environmental standards.
Despite the evolution of third-wave or new age agreements, there has
been little literature dealing with the eﬀects of preferential nontariﬀ provi-
sions. Two exceptions are Pomfret (1997, chapter 10) and Ethier (1998a,b,
1999, 2001), who deal primarily with eﬀects on investment.
Pomfret (1997) does not discuss in detail the economic welfare eﬀects
of discriminatory provisions governing foreign direct investment, but his
discussion of the welfare eﬀects of preferential nontariﬀ barriers to trade
is suggestive. Pomfret (1997) notes that the critical distinction is whether
nontariﬀ barriers are rent generating—allowing a markup of price over
cost—or whether they are cost escalating—increasing the real resource
costs of doing business.
The analogy with preferential liberalization of investment provisionsis as
follows:
• If investment barriers are of the sort to generate rents, then preferen-
tial liberalization will generate gains from investment creation as pro-
duction is moved from a high-cost domestically-owned producer to a
The Trade and Investment Eﬀects of Preferential Trading Arrangements 135
2. These are further developments of the arguments about the negative externalities from
terms of trade changes developed by Bond and Syropoulos (1996) and Bagwell and Staiger
(1998, 1999), among others.lower-cost member’s aﬃliate. But it will also generate losses from in-
vestment diversion as production is moved from a low-cost nonmem-
ber aﬃliate (located somewhere in the world) to a higher-cost member
aﬃliate.
• If investment barriers are of the sort to escalate costs, then preferen-
tial liberalization will unambiguously save real resources and increase
welfare, irrespective of whether the partner is the least-cost location
(see also Baldwin 1994).
Thus the welfare implications of preferentially liberalizing investment pro-
visions are more positive than they were for preferential tariﬀliberalization
because of the possibility of saving real resources. But the potential for
losses from investment diversion also remains.
In a series of papers, Ethier (1998a,b, 1999, 2001) develops variants of a
model in which investment responds in “beachhead” fashion to the prefer-
ential trade provisions of PTAs.
This model is an explicit attempt to capture some of the salient features
of third-wave PTAs. Many third-wave agreements are between small and
larger countries. The small countries want to reform their internal econ-
omies so that they can be accepted as members of the global trading sys-
tem. The sign of successful reform is whether these countries attract FDI.
The small countries use (often asymmetrical) trade concessions to large
countries as a way of signaling a credible commitment to reform.
There is no presumption in Ethier’s (1998b) framework that the invest-
ment they attract comes from the large PTA partner. The aim of these small
reforming countries is often to divert investment from nonmember coun-
tries. Ethier (2001) also examines in detail the incentives for the larger coun-
try to accede to such an arrangement, even in preference to pursuing fur-
ther multilateral reform. Finally, he shows that a world equilibrium in which
small countries compete for investment in this fashion is beneﬁcial because
it internalizes an externality associated with agglomeration economies.
Ethier’s (1998a,b, 1999, 2001) positive outlook on PTA formation comes
from this benign view of competition for investment, rather than from the
characteristics of PTAs per se. As he acknowledges, his model of PTA for-
mation is consistent with massive amounts of investment diversion to take
advantage of trade beachheads and subsequent trade diversion from those
beachhead positions. But in his model, there is suﬃcient symmetry be-
tween countries for this trade and investment diversion to have no adverse
welfare consequences—every country is the lowest-cost source of imports
and the best host for FDI. With more diversity, this massive diversion is no
longer benign.
Ethier’s (1998a,b, 1999, 2001) positive view also depends on the compe-
tition for investment occurring through reform, which is seen as a good
thing. If it were to occur through the competitive granting of investment in-
centives, or if reform involved inappropriate concessions forced by a larger
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itself be less benign.
At ﬁrst sight, the focus of third-wave agreements on nontariﬀissues may
suggest that traditional concerns about trade diversion are outmoded. But
the theoretical literature suggests otherwise. Investment barriers can be
used as a protective device, and preferential liberalization of investment
provisions can generate investment diversion, with adverse consequences,
as well as beneﬁcial investment creation. Even where investment is at-
tracted in beachhead fashion in response to trade liberalization provisions,
both the investment and subsequent trade from the beachhead position
may be diversionary. Thus the nontariﬀ focus of third-wave agreements
cannot shake the ﬁrst-wave concerns about the adverse second-best eﬀects
of preferential liberalization.
The second section of this paper summarizes the trade and nontrade pro-
visions included in a number of recent PTAs. The third section empirically
estimates the eﬀects of recent trade and nontrade provisions on bilateral
trade and investment ﬂows. The fourth section recapitulates the key ﬁndings.
5.2 Breadth of Coverage of PTAs
Figure 5.1 shows the discernible upward trend in the breadth of cover-
age of PTAs over recent times. On the vertical axis is an index measure of
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Fig. 5.1 Member Liberalization Index (MLI) for selected PTAs, index score
ranges between zero and one
Source: Adams et al. (2003).breadth of coverage, with provisions governing merchandise and nonmer-
chandise trade scored separately. The Member Liberalization Index (MLI)
is described in detail in Adams et al. (2003). On the horizontal axis is the
date of establishment. Coverage has clearly tended to increase in the more
recently established or expanded PTAs, and this has generally been be-
cause of an expansion in the coverage of nonmerchandise trade issues.
The index includes provisions covering the following:
• Agricultural products—including domestic support measures, tariﬀ
quotas, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, tax exceptions, export
incentives, and technical barriers to trade, among others
• Industrial products—including coverage and restrictiveness of rules
of origin, safeguards, antidumping, coverage and timing of tariﬀ pref-
erences, among others
• Services—including provisions governing market access and national
treatment in services
• General measures—general national treatment provisions, invest-
ment rules, domestic competition policy, government procurement,
intellectual property rights, and general provisions covering the tem-
porary and permanent movement of people
These provisions are classiﬁed into two subindexes for quantitative anal-
ysis. The merchandise MLI includes the provisions covering agriculture
and industrial products—an index of traditional provisions. The nonmer-
chandise MLI, covering third-wave issues, includes the services provisions,
plus the general measures covering all trade.
The coverage varies from one PTA to another. Some involve only a few
products or sectors, while others stretch well beyond the traditional tariﬀ
elimination. Note that the scores are based on how the language of the
agreements is written, not on whether or how the provisions are used. A
high index for nonmerchandise trade indicates that a PTA is more liberal
to members in its services trade, investment, and related provisions. This
index takes a high value for Singapore-New Zealand (NZ), followed by
Closer Economic Relations (CER) (between Australia and New Zealand),
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU.
The provisions indexed in the MLI are treated as additive to and in-
dependent of each other. In reality some provisions might interact to
strengthen or weaken other provisions. For example, the time schedule for
preferential tariﬀ liberalization is closely related to the restrictiveness of
rules of origin. The impact of interaction eﬀects among the provisions in
various PTAs is potentially an empirical question, but interaction eﬀects
have not been allowed for speciﬁcally in the construction of this index nor
in the subsequent econometric analysis. For this reason, the econometrics
may understate (where interaction eﬀects reinforce) or overstate (where in-
teraction eﬀects cancel) the overall eﬀects of PTAs.
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trade (or investment) provides an indication of whether provisions in-
cluded in PTAs have any eﬀect collectively on trade (or investment) ﬂows
with member or nonmember countries. Because PTAs are by deﬁnition ex-
clusive and discriminatory against nonmembers, trade and nontrade pro-
visions that are favorable to the intra-PTA trade (or investment) may be-
come barriers to nonmember countries.
5.3 Empirical Analyses
The key empirical task is to disentangle the eﬀects of PTA formation or
expansion from all other inﬂuences on trade and investment ﬂows. There
are two main approaches available in the literature.
First, ex ante studies have used counterfactual analyses based on partial
or general equilibrium models. These models assume a certain model
structure, with speciﬁc functional forms and parameter values to represent
the countries in a base year prior to the formation of the PTA. Those mod-
els with a suﬃciently tight theoretical structure can also be used to draw di-
rect inferences about welfare. The model is then subjected to the preferen-
tial removal of tariﬀs alone, and the welfare eﬀects are calculated. Surveys
of assessments of PTAs using general equilibrium models can be found
in De Rosa (1998) and Robinson and Thierfelder (2002). Scollay and Gil-
bert (2000) survey computable general equilibrium (CGE) assessments
of APEC. Most of these studies ﬁnd that PTAs create additional trade for
both members and nonmembers. Most also ﬁnd that PTAs improve wel-
fare, at least among member countries.
However, these CGE analyses suﬀer from a number of theoretical and
practical diﬃculties. Some (in particular, many of those covered by the
Robinson and Thierfelder [2002] survey) assume ﬁxed terms of trade. As
noted by Panagariya and Duttagupta (2002), this is inconsistent with one
of their other key assumptions, namely, product diﬀerentiation at the na-
tional level. Deardorﬀ and Stern (1994) note how the assumption of na-
tional product diﬀerentiation can itself leave an “idiosyncratic stamp” on
examinations of PTAs, in particular helping to explain Krugman’s (1993)
ﬁnding of welfare losses in a world of three trading blocs, a result that does
not appear to carry over to empirical CGE analyses. But in addition, the
assumption of ﬁxed terms of trade rules out one of the key eﬀects of PTAs,
namely, terms of trade changes.
Further, the CGE studies typically use a very simple characterization of
PTAs. Most assume comprehensive across-the-board elimination of tariﬀs
(and sometimes nontariﬀ barriers) among members, although most real-
world PTAs have complex patterns of exemptions. In addition, the studies
typically ignore many of the potentially trade-restrictive nontariﬀ mea-
sures, such as rules of origin or local content requirements, that typically
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provisions aﬀecting nonmerchandise trade (although a notable exception
is Hertel, Walmsley, and Itakura 2001).
This is not to deny that particular CGE models, when used with appro-
priate assumptions (such as variable terms of trade), can give valuable in-
sights into the possible eﬀects of important tariﬀ provisions of PTAs. But
conclusions drawn from surveys of CGE studies should be treated cau-
tiously. And the results from CGE studies should not be generalized to
draw conclusions about the eﬀects of nonmerchandise trade provisions of
PTAs.
By contrast, ex post studies of PTAs measure their trade creation and
trade diversion eﬀects by using econometric methods to establish a link
between actual PTA formation and actual trade outcomes, controlling for
the eﬀects of all other inﬂuences. Because welfare is unobservable, these
econometric studies cannot establish welfare eﬀects directly. And as noted
in the appendix, the link between trade outcomes and welfare is weak. But
the studies do examine actual PTAs, in all their complexity, including non-
merchandise trade provisions. The present study is an ex post evaluation of
the eﬀects of PTAs.
5.3.1 Gravity Model
The gravity model is the key ex post econometric technique used to ex-
amine the determinants of bilateral trade ﬂows. It is a model of trade ﬂows
based on an analogy with the law of gravity in physics. Trade between two
countries is positively related to their size and inversely related to the dis-
tance between them. A number of other explanatory variables are added
to this model to analyze various bilateral trade policy issues. In the aug-
mented gravity model, trade between two countries is determined by
supply conditions at the origin, demand conditions at the destination, and
various stimulating or restraining forces. This speciﬁcation has recently
been shown to be consistent with a number of theoretical models of inter-
national trade.3
The standard way of assessing the impact of PTAs is to add PTA-speciﬁc
binary dummy variables to the augmented gravity model to capture eﬀects
not captured through normal bilateral trade determinants. Studies adding
PTA-speciﬁc dummy variables to capture the trade creation and diversion
eﬀects of PTAs date back to the 1970s. Aitken (1973) initially added one
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3. The gravity model can be derived theoretically as a reduced form from a general equi-
librium model of international trade in goods. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) derived it from a
model of monopolistic competition. Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (2001) derived it from a
reciprocal dumping model of trade with homogeneous goods. Deardorﬀ (1998) derived it
from a model with perfectly competitive markets. Evenett and Keller (2002) showed empiri-
cally that the monopolistic-competition-based theory of trade ﬁts the trade ﬂows among
industrialized countries well. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) nevertheless showed that
many empirical implementations have strayed from the theoretically derived reduced form.dummy variable to his gravity model to capture the intrabloc eﬀect of a
PTA—“a gross trade eﬀect” of Balassa (1967). Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1995) and Frankel (1997) added two dummy variables for each PTA to
capture the separate eﬀects on intrabloc and extrabloc trade. The ﬁrst
dummy variable takes a value of one when the two countries are members
of the same PTA. The second dummy variable is one if either country in a
particular pair belongs to the PTA. If a positive coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst
dummy exceeds a negative coeﬃcient on the second, then trade creation
may be said to outweigh trade diversion.
Soloaga and Winters (2001) added three dummy variables for each PTA
to distinguish an intrabloc eﬀect, an extrabloc eﬀect on imports, and an
extrabloc eﬀect on exports (see ﬁgure 5.2). The second and third dummy
variables in their study measure the extent of import diversion and export
diversion, respectively. They argued that both are needed because bloc
members’ imports and exports could follow diﬀerent patterns after the for-
mation of a PTA.
The current analysis also uses three dummy variables for each PTA. But
instead of taking simple zero-one values, irrespective of the scope or cov-
erage of the PTA provisions, the dummies take the value of the MLI index
(or subindex) whenever the PTA is in force.
Because the gravity model is estimated using panel data, the PTA-
speciﬁc dummy variables are introduced in one of two ways. Firstly, dy-
namicPTA-speciﬁc indexes are deﬁned to take a nonzero value only for the
years in which a PTA between the two countries is in force and to take a
value of zero otherwise. These indexes capture the eﬀect of the formation,
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Fig. 5.2 Use of PTA-speciﬁc dummy variables in a gravity model—the example 
of NAFTA
Notes: D1 captures the eﬀects of NAFTA on intrabloc trade. D2 captures the eﬀects of
NAFTA on members’ imports from nonmembers—import diversion if the coeﬃcient is neg-
ative. D3 captures the eﬀects of NAFTA on members’ exports to nonmembers—export di-
version if the coeﬃcient is negative.expansion, and contraction of a PTA on trade and investment only after it
occurs. In contrast, antimonde PTA-speciﬁc indexes take a nonzero value
for all the years in the sample, irrespective of when the PTA was formed.
These antimonde indexes are used as the panel analogue to the nondy-
namic indexes of previous cross-sectional gravity model studies. They have
the same disadvantage as these studies of allowing the formation, expan-




The panel data includes information on all potential trading partners,
even when a country has no exports to some partners in some years. Be-
cause the nature of trade relations in many countries in the World Trade
Flows (1997, 2000) database is such that each country trades with a rela-
tively small number of partners, the dependent variable contains a signiﬁ-
cant number of zero observations as well as many positive observations.4
As a result, a Tobit estimation procedure is used to appropriately account
for the censored nature of the dependent variable—the natural log of ex-
ports between country i and country j in year t.5 Adams et al. (2003) de-
scribe the data sources in detail. The panel has a relatively long time di-
mension, covering 1970–1997 for the estimation of trade eﬀects (1988–
1997 for the estimation of investment eﬀects). While this risks the problem
of subsample instability, it has the advantage that it helps to overcome the
problem of nuisance parameters in the estimation of ﬁxed eﬀects in a Tobit
context (Greene 2002).
The gravity model estimated here allows for product diﬀerentiationat the
country level. Much of the recent literature on PTAs has focused on im-
perfectly competitive behavior. Recognizing this is important for two rea-
sons:
• Some economic integration has occurred among economies with al-
most similar structures and large volumes of intraindustry trade.
• There is a positive interaction between market structure and the gains
from integration, often called the procompetitive eﬀects of PTAs,
which the new age agreements aim to capture.
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4. For the full sample trade model, the number of observations is 116 countries   115 part-
ners   28 years   373,520, with about 44 percent having zero values.
5. There are a variety of alternate approaches to this problem. The zero values can be simply
omitted as in the case of Frankel (1997), which leads to the possibility of selectivity bias. Ar-
bitrarily small numbers can be used in place of zeros. Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) expressed
the dependent variable as Ln (1   Yij). Clark and Tavares (2000) and Soloaga and Winters
(2001) used a Tobit speciﬁcation for their cross-sectional gravity model.The product diﬀerentiation model of Helpman and Krugman (1985)
and Helpman (1987) is integrated into the current gravity model speciﬁca-
tion. In their models, one of the two goods is diﬀerentiated and the other is
homogenous. The bilateral trade of each country is the sum of interindus-
try and intraindustry trade ﬂows, with the latter being trade in the diﬀer-
entiated product.
The corresponding reduced form of gravity model for trade is
(1) Ln Y∗
ijt   a    i    j    t    1 Ln SGDPijt    2 Ln RLFAijt
   3 Ln Similarijt   4 Ln Disij   5 Ln RERijt   6 Ln TARijt
   7Linij    8Borij    9Colij    10Curij    11Isi    12Isj





MRTAi j  ∑
 i
MRTAj i   Ln εijt
where
Ln is natural logarithmic transformation;
Y∗
ijt is the value of exports from country i to j in year t; using exports
as a dependent variable rather than total bilateral trade allows
the identiﬁcation of export and import diversion separately;
 i is unobserved speciﬁc eﬀects in exporting country i;
 j is unobserved speciﬁc eﬀects in importing country j;
 t is unobserved speciﬁc eﬀects in time period t;
SGDP ijt is the sum of bilateral gross domestic products (GDPs) of i and j
in year t;
RLFAijt is the absolute diﬀerences in GDP per capita of i and j in year t;
Similarijt is similarity in country size between i and j in year t in terms of
aggregate GDP;
Disij is distance between the two largest or capital cities of countries i
and j;
RERijt is the bilateral real exchange rate between i and j in year t;
Tarijt is an average tariﬀ rate in importing country j on goods from
country i in year t;
Linij is a measure of linguistic similarity between i and j;
Borij is a dummy that takes a value 1 if i and j share a land border and
0 otherwise;
Colij is a dummy that takes a value 1 if i and j have colonial linkages
and 0 otherwise;
Curij is a dummy that takes a value 1 if i and j have the same currency
and 0 otherwise;
Isi is a dummy that takes a value 1 when iis island nations and 0 oth-
erwise;
The Trade and Investment Eﬀects of Preferential Trading Arrangements 143Locki is a dummy that takes a value 1 when i is a landlocked nation and
0 otherwise;
3waveij is an index capturing the third wave provisions of a PTA, that
takes a value of the nonmerchandise MLI index if the i and j are
participants of a speciﬁc PTA in the sample and 0 otherwise; it
also has a time dimension when deﬁned in dynamic rather than
antimonde form;
MRTAij is an index capturing the merchandise trade provisions of a PTA,
that takes the value of the merchandise MLI if both countries i
and j belong to the same PTA and 0 otherwise; it also has a time
dimension when deﬁned in dynamic rather than antimonde form;
MRTAi–j is an index that takes the value of the merchandise MLI when the
importing country j belongs to that particular PTA and 0 other-
wise; it also has a time dimension when deﬁned in dynamic rather
than antimonde form;
MRTAj–i is an index that takes the value of the merchandise MLI when the
exporting country i belongs to that particular PTA and 0 other-
wise; it also has time dimension when deﬁned in dynamic rather
than antimonde form; and
εijt is an error term.
From an econometric point of view, the  i,  j and  t speciﬁc eﬀects are
treated as ﬁxed unknown parameters. The use of three separate ﬁxed eﬀects
is advocated by Matyas (1997, 1998) and avoids the omitted variable bias
identiﬁed by Haveman and Hummels (1998) and Anderson and van Win-
coop (2003).
The expected relationship of the observed explanatory variables with bi-
lateral exports is discussed in detail in Adams et al. (2003). In a model of
product diﬀerentiation, countries similar in size will trade more, and the
trade will be of an intraindustry nature. The index of size similarity (Simi-
lar) captures this eﬀect. By contrast, traditional trade theory says that
countries with dissimilar levels of per capita GDP will trade more than the
countries with similar levels. The absolute diﬀerence in the per capita GDP
between exporting and importing countries (RLFA) is included as an ex-
planatory variable in the gravity model as a way of distinguishing the tra-
ditional from the diﬀerentiated product approaches.6
The preceding gravity model speciﬁcation includes the real exchange
rate (RER) as a relevant price variable in order to control for ﬂuctuations
in relative prices among trading partners.
The average bilateral tariﬀ rate (Tar) is expected to show a negative rela-
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6. The speciﬁcation based on product diﬀerentiation in the preceding also diﬀers from tra-
ditional gravity model speciﬁcations by including the sum of importing and exporting coun-
try GDPs, rather than including each separately. This small loss of generality means that the
product diﬀerentiation version does not encompass the traditional model fully.tionship with trade. The PTA-speciﬁc indexes capture the extent of tradi-
tional and new age provisions of a PTA but not the size of the tariﬀ prefer-
ences thereby created. Because the bilateral tariﬀ variable includes prefer-
ential tariﬀs,7 the overall measured eﬀect of PTAs on trade will be split
between the tariﬀ variable and the PTA-speciﬁc indexes in speciﬁcations
where both occur. To test whether the coeﬃcients of the PTA-speciﬁc in-
dexes are sensitive to the inclusion of the tariﬀ variable, the gravity model
is estimated initially without the tariﬀ variable. It is then reestimated with
the tariﬀvariable for that subset of countries and time periods for which bi-
lateral tariﬀ data are available.
Eﬀects on Investment
The product diﬀerentiation speciﬁcation also provides a rationale for
applying the gravity model to investment ﬂows (Egger 2001).
The raw FDI data for this analysis are sourced from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for the period be-
tween 1988 and 1997 for about seventy-seven countries (see Adams et al.
2003). As there are some deﬁciencies in this data, the qualitative aspects of
the analytical results rather than the precise magnitude of the investment
estimates are of main interest.
The dependent variable in the gravity model is the natural logarithm of
the stock of outward investment from home country to host country. The
stock of outward investment is used as the dependent variable, rather than
outﬂows, for two reasons. First, more outward stock than outﬂow data are
available in the source documents. For many countries in the late 1980s and
for some Latin American countries in early 1990s, the bilateral FDI ﬂow
data are not fully reported in the UNCTAD investment directories. Sec-
ond, statistical tests suggested that a gravity model based on the stock of
outward investment was preferred to a model based on outﬂows.
Apart from the more limited number of years and countries analyzed,
the investment model is similar to the trade model. In particular, the key bi-
lateral determinants are the same for trade and investment (see also Egger
2001), although the sign and magnitude of the impact of some of these ex-
planatory variables diﬀers.
For each PTA, three merchandise MLIs and three indexes of third-wave
provisions are included in the investment gravity model to test how the
investment to members, and to and from nonmembers, responds to the
traditional and third-wave provisions embedded in each PTA. Three mer-
chandise MLIs and only one (intrabloc) nonmerchandise MLI were in-
cluded in the trade gravity model. Because of model convergence prob-
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7. The bilateral tariﬀ data are applied rates obtained from UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis and
Information System (TRAINS) database. As such they incorporate tariﬀ preferences.lems, the eﬀects of new age provisions on exports to nonmembers and
imports from nonmembers could not be analyzed separately in the trade
model.
Two additional variables are added to the investment model because in
addition to the investment provisions of PTAs, countries also negotiate bi-
lateral investment treaties (BITs). About 191 PTAs were in force in 2000,
with only a few covering investment provisions, while 1,941 BITs were in
place then. The speciﬁcation controls for whether an investment treaty is
either signed or enacted between a pair of countries.
There are clearly some interdependencies between the trade equation
and the investment equation, but in the absence of the remaining elements
of the balance of payments, there is an insuﬃciently tight link to warrant
seemingly unrelated regression or some other systems-estimation tech-
nique. Similarly, there are no obvious cross-equation restrictions that
would improve the eﬃciency of estimation. One option would have been to
include trade ﬂows in the investment equation and investment ﬂows in the
trade equation, but this would have created a severe simultaneity problem.
In the current PTA context, it was felt that including trade PTA dummies
in the investment equation and vice versa was a minimalist approach to
capturing the interdependencies.
The expected eﬀects of traditional and new age provisions on investment
are not straightforward.
If trade liberalization makes exporting from the home country relatively
more attractive than FDI as a way to serve the regional market, then the
trade provisions of a PTA could cause a reduction in intrabloc investment.
But the trade provisions could also enable transnational corporations to op-
erate vertically in a PTA area, stimulating intra-FDI ﬂows among the rele-
vant partners. The structure and motivation of investment will determine
the net impact of trade provisions of PTAs on intra-PTA investment. So too
will the structure and motivation of intrabloc trade (Markusen 1983).
According to Ethier (1998b, 2001), the inﬂows of FDI from nonmember
countries into the PTA region are likely to go up in response to the trade
provisions of PTAs, as nonmembers establish beachhead positions in one
PTA member country in order to serve the market of the others. Alterna-
tively, if multinationals are initially operating in member countries to serve
the protected local market (the tariﬀ jumping motivation for investment),
then these multinationals may rationalize their network of aﬃliates after
the formation of the PTA, and, as a result, some member countries could
lose investment to nonmember countries.
Thus, the response of investment to the merchandise trade provisions of
a PTA is an empirical question. The various possibilities can be tested in
the following way.
If investment responds in beachhead fashion to the trade provisions of
PTAs and in turn stimulates intrabloc trade, this can be identiﬁed by the
combination of a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of trade provisions on intra-
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ment from nonmember countries.
Alternatively, a reversal of tariﬀ-jumping investment can be identiﬁed by
a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of trade provisions on investment to non-
member countries.
Investment may also respond to the nontrade provisions of PTAs. If, as
a result, production is moved from a high-cost domestically owned pro-
ducer to a lower-cost member’s aﬃliate, this investment creation is likely to
beneﬁt members of the PTA. But if production is moved from a low-cost
nonmember aﬃliate to a higher-cost member aﬃliate, this investment di-
version may not beneﬁt members.
Measures of net investment creation or diversion can be obtained by
summing the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of the three separate nonmerchandise
MLI variables in parallel fashion to the trade equation. One further quali-
ﬁcation to the welfare implications of investment is that if the initial non-
trade restrictions are of the sort to raise costs rather than generate rents,
then any investment relocation in response to their preferential removal
will unambiguously beneﬁt members.
5.3.3 New Evidence on Trade Creation and Diversion
The observable eﬀects—normal bilateral trade determinants and trade
provisions of PTAs—and unobservable country- and time-speciﬁc eﬀects
all signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the bilateral trade ﬂows. The signs and signiﬁ-
cance of the coeﬃcients on the observable eﬀects are generally as expected
(see table 5.1). Interestingly, they support both traditional and product di-
ﬀerentiation theories of trade because similarity in size and diﬀerences in
income per head are both associated with higher bilateral exports. In the
preferred speciﬁcation with dynamic PTA variables and ﬁxed eﬀects, the
coeﬃcient on the sum of GDPs is about 2, as expected.
The new estimates of trade creation and diversion tend to be diﬀerent
from past estimates for most PTAs. Past estimates showed most PTAs to be
trade creating in net terms. By contrast, the results here suggest most PTAs
do not create additional trade, either for members or for nonmembers of
the agreement. The net trade eﬀects of preferential agreements found in
this study are compared with past estimates in table 5.2, which shows
whether the net eﬀects are positive or negative.
Nearly all PTAs are found to have caused net trade diversion in the new
assessment. The PTAs found to have inconclusive eﬀects in past analysis
drifted either way in the new assessment, but the Southern Common Mar-
ket (MERCOSUR) was found here to have caused net trade diversion.8
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8. The assessment of net trade eﬀects is based on the marginal eﬀects of PTAs reported in
Adams et al. (2003), rather than the raw maximum likelihood Tobit estimates in table 5.1, for
the preferred speciﬁcation with dynamic PTA variables and ﬁxed eﬀects. Although the mar-
ginal eﬀects and raw Tobit estimates are not equal (as explained in Adams et al. 2003), in prac-
tice the assessment of the direction of net trade eﬀects is the same, whichever is used.Table 5.1 Gravity model of trade: Econometric results from full sample
Dynamic PTA indexes Antimonde PTA indexes
Without With Without With 
Variable name ﬁxed ﬁxeda ﬁxed ﬁxeda,b
Ln sum of exporting and importing 
countries GDP (SUM) 2.841∗∗∗ 2.008∗∗∗ 2.185∗∗∗ 2.066∗∗∗
Similarity in exporting and importing 
country’s GDPs 1.245∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗
Ln of absolute diﬀerences in per capita 
GDPs of exporting and importing country 0.361∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
Ln distance –1.729∗∗∗ –2.193∗∗∗ –2.292∗∗∗ –2.306∗∗∗
Ln bilateral real exchange rate 0.162∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
Linguistic similarity 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Colonial 1.167∗∗∗ 1.759∗∗∗ 1.628∗∗∗ 1.575∗∗∗
Border –0.088 –0.571∗∗∗ –0.529∗∗∗ –0.626∗∗∗
Currency union 1.201∗∗∗ 3.136∗∗∗ 1.148∗∗∗ 3.025∗∗∗
Exporting country is an island 0.684∗∗∗ –2.250∗∗∗ 0.670∗∗∗ 0.289
Importing country is an island 1.070∗∗∗ –3.369∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗ –3.268∗∗∗
Exporting country is landlocked –2.292∗∗∗ –3.456∗∗∗ –1.869∗∗∗ –0.648∗
Importing country is landlocked –2.052∗∗∗ 3.276∗∗∗ –1.929∗∗∗ 4.515∗∗∗
Third-wave provisions of PTAs 20.074∗∗∗ 13.899∗∗∗ –10.760∗∗∗ –8.748∗∗∗
Andean1 3.135∗ 4.544∗∗∗ 3.871∗∗∗ 2.774∗∗∗
Andean2 2.496∗∗∗ –0.600 11.257∗∗∗
Andean3 –0.943∗∗∗ –3.088∗∗∗ 13.716∗∗∗
APEC1c –2.081∗∗∗ –2.727∗∗∗ –0.052 0.091∗
APEC2c –0.240∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 2.118∗∗∗ –0.666∗∗∗
APEC3c 1.245∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 4.404∗∗∗ 1.941∗∗∗
EFTA1 –6.252∗∗∗ –7.023∗∗∗ –1.972 –0.690
EFTA2 12.322∗∗∗ 0.252 9.111∗∗∗
EFTA3 17.195∗∗∗ 3.141∗∗∗ 15.189∗∗∗
EC/EU1 –16.129∗∗∗ –16.022∗∗∗ 8.763∗∗∗ 9.608∗∗∗
EC/EU2 5.344∗∗∗ –1.209∗∗∗ –8.208∗∗∗ 10.632∗∗∗
EC/EU3 6.343∗∗∗ –0.486∗ –7.920∗∗∗ 18.188∗∗∗
GCC1c –0.400 –1.782∗∗∗ –0.135 –0.341∗
GCC2c –0.498∗∗∗ 0.139∗ 0.950∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗
GCC3c –2.098∗∗∗ –0.600∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 2.379∗∗∗
LAFTA/LAIA1 30.591∗∗∗ 17.419∗∗∗ 28.057∗∗∗ 26.432∗∗∗
LAFTA/LAIA2 –20.659∗∗∗ –6.517∗∗∗ –22.841∗∗∗
LAFTA/LAIA3 –5.267∗∗∗ –0.635 –32.910∗∗∗
MERCOSUR1 –6.894∗∗ –9.376∗∗∗ 0.800 1.075
MERCOSUR2 1.451∗∗∗ 1.929∗∗∗ –5.002∗∗∗
MERCOSUR3 2.917∗∗∗ –1.306∗∗∗ 23.916∗∗∗
NAFTA1 –17.152∗∗∗ –14.970∗∗∗ –2.072 –0.966
NAFTA2 5.195∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗ 7.310∗∗∗
NAFTA3 –2.720∗∗∗ –0.790 –1.938∗∗∗
SPARTECA1 42.499∗∗∗ 35.093∗∗∗ 31.956∗∗∗ 31.573∗∗∗
SPARTECA2 –9.865∗∗∗ –0.402 –12.250∗∗∗
SPARTECA3 –13.312∗∗∗ 0.557 –18.496∗∗∗
CER1 –28.857∗∗∗ –24.283∗∗∗ –16.504∗∗∗ –17.251∗∗∗
CER2 3.329∗∗∗ –2.229∗∗∗ 2.285∗∗∗
CER3 8.040∗∗∗ –2.073∗∗∗ 7.650∗∗∗
EU-Switzerland1 –24.872∗∗∗ –32.320∗∗∗ –28.599∗∗∗ –27.680∗∗∗Table 5.1 (continued)
Dynamic PTA indexes Antimonde PTA indexes
Without With Without With 
Variable name ﬁxed ﬁxeda ﬁxed ﬁxeda,b
EU-Switzerland2 9.457∗∗∗ 5.339∗∗∗ 25.975∗∗∗
EU-Switzerland3 11.542∗∗∗ 5.076∗∗∗ 26.380∗∗∗
Chile-Colombia1 –17.149∗∗ –14.407∗∗ 4.525∗ 3.281
Chile-Colombia2 2.234∗∗∗ 4.116∗∗∗ –4.483∗∗∗




US-Israel1 15.060∗∗∗ 10.984∗∗∗ 14.783∗∗∗ 14.185∗∗∗
US-Israel2 –5.774∗∗∗ –2.725∗∗∗ 1.888∗∗∗
US-Israel3 1.112∗∗ –1.435∗∗ 9.056∗∗∗
Australia-PNG1 0.669 –6.200∗∗ –10.816∗∗∗ –10.797∗∗∗
Australia-PNG2 0.784∗ –1.202∗ 2.390∗∗∗
Australia-PNG3 1.487∗∗∗ –0.946 –2.706∗∗∗
Singapore-New Zealand1 2.186∗ 1.802∗
Singapore-New Zealand2 4.390∗∗∗
Singapore-New Zealand3 3.587∗∗∗
Chile-MERCOSUR1 –7.199∗∗ –11.064∗∗∗ –3.888∗∗∗ –4.124∗∗∗
Chile-MERCOSUR2 2.632∗∗∗ 2.136∗∗∗ 11.792∗∗∗
Chile-MERCOSUR3 0.328 1.145∗∗∗ 1.603∗∗∗
EU-Egypt1 –4.724 –8.702∗∗∗ 0.622 –0.055
EU-Egypt2 –12.498∗∗∗ 3.048∗∗∗ 3.582∗∗∗
EU-Egypt3 –15.582∗∗∗ 4.185∗∗∗ –2.505∗∗∗
EU-Poland1 –19.307∗∗∗ –27.309∗∗∗ –9.699∗∗∗ –11.991∗∗∗
EU-Poland2 –4.386∗∗∗ –0.834∗∗∗ 13.716∗∗∗
EU-Poland3 –2.186∗∗∗ –0.741∗∗ 21.851∗∗∗
AFTA1 –3.783 –9.232∗∗∗ –5.953∗∗∗ –5.597∗∗∗
AFTA2 7.170∗∗∗ 4.191∗∗∗ 0.492∗
AFTA3 7.375∗∗∗ 4.826∗∗∗ –2.095∗∗∗
Constant –12.101 –2.067∗∗∗ –1.962∗∗∗ –1.910∗∗∗
LR  2 (chi2) 307,352.95 422,218.2 351,561.7 424,106.7
Log likelihood –686,398.4 –629,010.8 –664,294.0 –628,021.5
  (standard deviation of the 
error term) 4.407 3.547 4.036 3.542
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes:Dependent variable  Ln exports; time period  1970–1997; unbalanced panel; Tobit maximum
likelihood estimates.
aTo save space the ﬁxed eﬀect coeﬃcients associated with exporting country, importing country, and
time are not reported here.
bIn the antimonde speciﬁcation, some PTA indexes are dropped because of high multicollinearity be-
tween the country-ﬁxed eﬀects and the PTA indexes.
cWhile a Member Liberalization Index has not been calculated for APEC (a nonpreferential arrange-
ment) or for the Gulf Cooperative Council (a preferential one), their possible eﬀects on the trade ﬂows
of their members have been controlled for through a set of three conventional zero-one dummy variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Overall, the main PTAs—NAFTA, the European Community (EC/
EU), MERCOSUR, and CER—as well as many bilateral agreements not
considered previously, are found here to have created negative net trade
eﬀects. However, there is a qualiﬁcation to this ﬁnding. In agreements with
a small number of members, the intra-PTA eﬀect is estimated imprecisely,
with a large standard error, while the extra-PTA eﬀect can be estimated
more accurately.9 Thus, the ﬁndings for those PTAs, such as CER, with a
small number of members are less robust than those for larger PTAs. In ad-
dition, the measures of distance used in this study are unlikely to capture
fully the ways in which changes in trading patterns and reductions in trans-
port costs have raised the attractiveness of extrabloc as opposed to intra-
bloc trade for CER members over time.
As noted, the net trade eﬀect criterion has limitations in assessing the
eﬀects on economic welfare. Nonetheless the new evidence suggests nega-
tive net trade eﬀects for many PTAs, controlling for other factors.
A number of factors have contributed to the more negative ﬁndings in
this study. These are now considered in turn.
All the past gravity model studies surveyed here estimated the PTA
eﬀects using PTA dummies deﬁned in antimonde form.10 The comparable
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9. For example, the intra-CER dummy has positive values only for 14   15   210 observa-
tions and zero for remaining observations.
10. A more recent study with panel data and dynamic dummies is by Fukao, Okubo, and
Stern (2003).
Table 5.2 New evidence on PTAs as causing net trade creation or diversion
Past estimates New estimates
Net trade  Net trade  Net trade  Net trade 
creation Inconclusive diversion creation diversion
Andean LAIA NAFTA Andean AFTA
CER MERCOSUR LAFTA/LAIA EFTA










Sources: Past estimates assessment based on the ﬁndings from a majority of the following
studies: Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995), Boisso and Fer-
rantino (1997), Frankel (1997), Fink and Primo Braga (1999), Krueger (1999b), Li (2000),
Clark and Tavares (2000), Freund (2000), Gilbert, Scollay, and Bora (2001), and Soloaga and
Winters (2001); table 5.1 source.dynamic and antimonde estimates in this analysis are reported in table 5.1.
They show that when PTA dummies are deﬁned in antimonde form, the net
trade eﬀects are mainly positive, in contrast to the negative eﬀects obtained
for dynamic PTA variables.
In essence, when dummies are deﬁned in dynamic form, the test for sig-
niﬁcance of their coeﬃcients is a statistical test for whether the trade eﬀects
they capture are stronger after the formation or expansion of the PTA than
before. In the past, this question has been assessed, at best, only by refer-
ence to the point estimates from various cross sections. Deﬁning PTA dum-
mies in dynamic form provides a more stringent statistical test of whether
it was PTA formation, rather than some other set of factors speciﬁc to the
bilateral country pair, accounting for the observed trade eﬀects. The power
of the test is further strengthened by the fact that individual country- and
time-speciﬁc eﬀects are controlled for separately, through the ﬁxed eﬀects.
The more stringent test of the before and after eﬀects of PTAs is the major
factor accounting for the more negative ﬁndings of this study.
The diﬀerences are more prominent for the EC/EU and MERCOSUR
agreements, where membership dynamics play an important role in their
trade creation and diversion eﬀects. For example, a signiﬁcant negative
intra-EU eﬀect is found when using dynamic PTA speciﬁc indexes, com-
pared to a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect found using antimonde indexes. The
dynamic dummies account for individual countries switching from the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) to the EU.
Another reason for the more negative ﬁndings in this study is the use of
panel analysis, which allows unobservable heterogeneity to be controlled
for. Without allowing for country-speciﬁc eﬀects, the coeﬃcients on both
the PTA variables and the other explanatory variables tend to be upward
biased as are the test statistics for the signiﬁcance of these variables. The
likelihood-ratio test conﬁrms the joint signiﬁcance of the ﬁxed eﬀects.11
This suggests that inferences based on past gravity model estimates with-
out ﬁxed eﬀects suﬀer from omitted variable bias. Controlling for unob-
servable heterogeneity is another reason for the more negative ﬁndings in
this study.12
A model with the average bilateral tariﬀ variable as an additional deter-
minant of trade is estimated on a restricted data set,13 and the results are
shown in table 5.3. The average tariﬀ rate in the importing country has a
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11. The calculated test statistic of 114,775.3 clearly rejects the null hypothesis, as is expected
given the individual signiﬁcance of most of the country- and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in the
model.
12. The ﬁndings here are also more negative than those in a recent panel study by Clarete,
Edmonds, and Wallack (2003). However, their study uses antimonde dummies and fails to
control for unobserved country- and time-speciﬁc heterogeneity. It also controls for fewer ob-
servable factors than here.
13. The data set is restricted because of the lack of bilateral tariﬀdata for a number of coun-
tries and for a number of years.Table 5.3 Gravity model of trade: Results from limited sample with tariﬀ variable included
Dynamic PTA speciﬁc  Antimonde PTA speciﬁc 
variables—ﬁxed eﬀectsa variables—ﬁxed eﬀectsa,b
Without With Without With 
Variable name tariﬀ tariﬀ tariﬀ tariﬀ
Ln sum of exporting and importing countries 
GDP (SUM) 2.063∗∗∗ 2.036∗∗∗ 2.838∗∗∗ 2.869∗∗∗
Similarity in exporting and importing country’s 
GDPs 0.562∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 1.534∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗∗
Ln of absolute diﬀerences in per capita GDPs 
of exporting and importing country –0.154∗∗∗ –0.086∗∗∗ –0.100∗∗∗ –0.031
Ln distance –1.404∗∗∗ –1.393∗∗∗ –1.458∗∗∗ –1.469∗∗∗
Ln bilateral real exchange rate 0.494∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
Ln tariﬀ –0.134∗∗∗ –0.142∗∗∗
Linguistic similarity 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Colonial 1.141∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗
Border –0.099 –0.052 –0.138 –0.079
Currency union 0.230 0.425 0.203 0.421
Exporting country is an island –0.718∗∗∗ –0.746∗∗∗ –0.472∗∗∗ –0.492∗∗∗
Importing country is an island 1.177∗∗∗ 1.338∗∗∗ 4.027∗∗∗ 4.380∗∗∗
Exporting country is landlocked –1.402∗∗∗ –1.315∗∗∗ –1.251∗∗∗ –1.166∗∗∗
Importing country is landlocked –0.236 –0.300 0.421∗∗ 0.429∗∗
Third-wave provisions of PTAs 1.222 1.748 –1.328 –2.067
Andean1 5.702∗∗∗ 5.545∗∗∗ 5.123∗∗∗ 5.123∗∗∗
Andean2 –8.696∗∗∗ –8.485∗∗∗ 2.428∗∗ 3.014∗∗∗
Andean3 –1.503∗∗∗ –1.461∗∗∗ 9.368∗∗∗ 9.130∗∗∗
APEC1c 0.929∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗
APEC2c –0.839∗∗∗ –0.817∗∗∗ –6.988∗∗∗ –7.133∗∗∗
APEC3c 3.062∗∗∗ 2.994∗∗∗ 3.500∗∗∗ 3.414∗∗∗
EFTA1 0.203 0.796 3.117 2.963
EFTA2 12.657∗∗∗ 14.513∗∗∗
EFTA3 11.631∗∗∗ 11.115∗∗∗ 8.552∗∗∗ 8.364∗∗∗
EU1 –3.231∗∗∗ 3.626∗∗∗ 5.341∗∗∗
EU2 5.184∗∗∗ 6.189∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗ 2.207∗∗∗
EU3 –0.572 –0.289 –5.442∗∗∗ –5.031∗∗∗
GCC1c 2.348 2.406 2.210 2.217
GCC2c –0.537 0.173 –1.452
GCC3c –0.186∗∗ –0.267∗∗∗ 0.051 –0.026
LAIA1 16.159∗∗∗ 16.046∗∗∗ 17.917∗∗∗ 17.605∗∗∗
LAIA2 23.259∗∗∗ 24.735∗∗∗
LAIA3 15.478∗∗∗ 14.820∗∗∗ –16.838∗∗∗ –16.752∗∗∗
MERCOSUR1 –1.432 –1.132 3.227 3.169
MERCOSUR2 –8.512∗∗∗ –8.380∗∗∗
MERCOSUR3 1.793∗∗∗ 1.969∗∗∗ 18.830∗∗∗ 18.874∗∗∗
NAFTA1 –2.800 –2.692 2.551 3.315
NAFTA2 13.591∗∗∗ 14.416∗∗∗ 29.870∗∗∗ 31.170∗∗∗
NAFTA3 –8.453∗∗∗ –8.562∗∗∗ –8.137∗∗∗ –8.385∗∗∗
SPARTECA1 17.033∗∗∗ 18.523∗∗∗ 17.702∗∗∗ 19.271∗∗∗
SPARTECA3 –11.930∗∗∗ –12.128∗∗∗ –14.163∗∗∗ –14.880∗∗∗
CER1 –8.356∗∗ –8.976 –6.959∗∗ –7.056∗∗Table 5.3 (continued)
Dynamic PTA speciﬁc  Antimonde PTA speciﬁc 
variables—ﬁxed eﬀectsa variables—ﬁxed eﬀectsa,b
Without With Without With 
Variable name tariﬀ tariﬀ tariﬀ tariﬀ
CER2 4.704∗∗∗ 5.267∗∗ 9.138∗∗∗ 9.382∗∗∗
CER3 8.616∗∗∗ 8.523∗∗∗ 7.378∗∗∗ 7.396∗∗∗
EU-Switzerland1 –15.405∗∗∗ –14.934∗∗∗ –15.718∗∗∗ –15.541∗∗∗
EU-Switzerland3 17.254∗∗∗ 16.723∗∗∗ 21.229∗∗∗ 20.401∗∗∗
Chile-Colombia1 0.079 0.416 –1.304 –0.673
Chile-Colombia2 3.275∗∗∗ 3.013∗∗∗ –18.101∗∗∗ –18.457∗∗∗




US-Israel1 7.763 10.386∗ 10.255∗ 13.218∗∗
US-Israel3 11.120∗∗∗ 10.649∗∗∗ 10.811∗∗∗ 10.341∗∗∗
Australia-PNG1 –1.166 –2.097 –3.080 –5.104
Australia-PNG3 –1.492∗ –1.382 –3.609∗∗∗ –3.157∗∗∗
Singapore-NZ1 –0.235 1.892
Singapore-NZ3 1.307∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗
Chile-MERCOSUR1 –3.654∗ –3.440 –3.682∗∗∗ –3.478∗∗∗
Chile-MERCOSUR2 1.403∗∗∗ 1.321∗∗∗ –4.953∗∗∗ –4.780∗∗∗
Chile-MERCOSUR3 –1.171∗∗ –1.148∗∗ –2.080∗∗ –2.222∗∗
EU-Egypt1 5.573 5.454 5.688∗∗ 4.870∗
EU-Egypt3 0.682 0.144 0.336 0.006
EU-Poland1 2.517 1.837 –3.763∗∗ –4.049∗∗
EU-Poland2 –1.457∗∗∗ –0.600∗
EU-Poland3 2.099∗∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗ 10.075∗∗∗ 9.820∗∗∗
AFTA1 –9.693∗∗∗ –8.204∗ –9.629∗∗∗ –8.946∗∗∗
AFTA2 –0.484 0.354
AFTA3 3.060∗∗∗ 2.827∗∗∗ 0.572 0.222
LR  2 (chi2) 32,088.3 28,186.5 33,800.9 29,892.8
Log likelihood –77,034.8 –71,010.6 –76,178.6 –70,157.4
  (standard deviation of the error term) 2.859 2.855 2.776 2.766
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes:Dependent variable  Ln exports; time period  1998–1997; unbalanced panel; Tobit maximum
likelihood estimates.
aTo save space, the ﬁxed eﬀect coeﬃcients associated with exporting country, importing country, and
time are not reported here.
bIn the antimonde speciﬁcation, some PTA indexes are dropped because of high multicollinearity be-
tween country-ﬁxed eﬀects and PTA indexes.
cWhile a Member Liberalization Index has not been calculated for APEC (a nonpreferential arrange-
ment) or for the Gulf Cooperative Council (a preferential one), their possible eﬀects on the trade ﬂows
of their members have been controlled for through a set of three conventional zero-one dummy variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on its imports, as expected. The PTA-
speciﬁc indexes also show a signiﬁcant eﬀect. This is because they capture
not only the existence of tariﬀ preferences (as also captured in the tariﬀ
variable) but also the eﬀects of nontariﬀ measures aﬀecting merchandise
trade, such as rules of origin.
The coeﬃcients on the PTA-speciﬁc indexes are generally not sensitive
to the inclusion or exclusion of the tariﬀvariable. So the inclusion of a tariﬀ
variable makes little diﬀerence to the main ﬁndings of this study. But in
some cases, negative intrabloc trade eﬀects in the full sample become pos-
itive in the smaller sample. And perhaps not surprisingly, while the com-
parative advantage motivation for trade showed as signiﬁcant in the full
sample (with a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence in per
capita GDP), this is not the case in the restricted sample. These diﬀerences
also show that what constitutes “normal” trade is conditioned by how
many countries and years are in the sample—those studies with restricted
time and country coverage, particularly where it is restricted to high-
income developed countries, are likely to have results biased accordingly.
The nonmerchandise provisions show a positive (complementary) rela-
tionship with trade when PTA indexes are deﬁned dynamically. Thus fa-
vorable investment and services trade provisions in PTAs can enhance
merchandise trade between member countries once the agreement is in op-
eration.
In summary, the main result is that PTAs are not as relatively benign as
previous studies have indicated. After controlling for country- and time-
speciﬁc eﬀects and the degree of liberalization of merchandise trade provi-
sions in an unrestricted sample and testing explicitly for whether the trade
eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent after PTA formation than before, most
PTAs were estimated to have negative trade creation. Other recent empiri-
cal assessments have shown a more optimistic outlook for trade in prefer-
ential agreements by ignoring these analytical issues.
One potential puzzle is that the intrabloc eﬀect is found to be negative for
apparently more comprehensive and liberal PTAs—EU, CER, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR and some of the recent bilateral agreements. One possible
reason is that total elimination of tariﬀs among members, as required by
the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV, may
not be optimal for members. For example, Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995)
found that a 22 percent reduction in tariﬀs below multilateral tariﬀ levels
may instead be optimal. However, this ﬁnding is driven by welfare eﬀects,
not by trade volume eﬀects.
A more likely explanation is that, although the merchandise MLI used
in this study has attempted to capture the potentially trade-restrictive ef-
fects of the nontariﬀ merchandise trade provisions embodied in PTAs, it
has not always captured them adequately. For example, as noted earlier, the
merchandise MLI has treated the trade restrictive eﬀects of rules of origin
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reality, not only are rules of origin restrictive, they are also likely to neu-
tralize or even reverse the trade eﬀects of other provisions that are appar-
ently quite liberal.14
The way in which rules of origin can operate in practice to counter the
eﬀects of other provisions that are apparently quite liberal can be seen
most clearly in the case of NAFTA. There, the rules of origin are relatively
complex—the speciﬁcation of requirements for minimum change in tariﬀ
heading vary product by product and take up several hundred pages. Fur-
ther, they are strictly enforced. The domestic content rules applied in the
EU are also relatively complex. Even if the tariﬀs on each product are elim-
inated entirely (an apparently quite liberal provision), the complex rules of
origin governing the sourcing of inputs to qualify for the tariﬀ concession
on output can undo the liberal eﬀect of the tariﬀ concession on output.
This is not recognized in the MLI, which treats tariﬀ provisions and rules
of origin additively, not interactively. Thus, the MLI may overstate the
eﬀective amount of liberalization in agreements with complex rules of ori-
gin, explaining why it was that the apparently more comprehensive and lib-
eralized PTAs were found to have a negative intrabloc eﬀect, relative to av-
erage trade patterns in the sample.
Sensitivity Analysis
The preceding model speciﬁcation diﬀers from standard speciﬁcations
in several respects. One is the inclusion of the sum of importing and ex-
porting country GDPs, rather than each country’s GDP separately. As
noted, this comes from a model of product diﬀerentiation originating with
Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Helpman (1987). But in the original
model, the dependent variable was total bilateral trade—the sum of ex-
ports in both directions—rather than bilateral exports. This paper has fol-
lowed Egger (2001) and others by using bilateral exports as the dependent
variable to allow a more reﬁned examination of the trade diversion issue.
And the resulting estimate of the coeﬃcient on the sum of GDPs is very
similar to that of Egger (2001). But the question arises whether the results
are sensitive to this treatment of GDPs, especially given the redeﬁnition of
the dependent variable. To test this, the preceding model was reestimated
with (the log of) GDPs of importing and exporting country entered sepa-
rately. The coeﬃcient on the exporting country’s GDP was 1.118, and the
coeﬃcient on the importing country’s GDP was 0.766, with the sum being
close to the result in table 5.1. In all other respects, the results were similar
to those shown in table 5.1. The results are available on request from the
authors.
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14. For analyses of the welfare eﬀects of rules of origin, see Duttagupta and Panagariya
(2003), Krueger (1999a), Ju and Krishna (1998), and Krishna and Krueger (1995).The speciﬁcation also diﬀers from some others by using triple-indexed
ﬁxed eﬀects, controlling separately for importing country, exporting coun-
try, and time-related unobservable eﬀects. This is in contrast to speciﬁca-
tions that use a single country-pair ﬁxed eﬀect as well as a time eﬀect. As
noted, the triple-indexed approach was advocated by Matyas (1997, 1998)
for econometric reasons. It is also the approach needed to control for the
misspeciﬁcations identiﬁed by Haveman and Hummels (1998) and Ander-
son and van Wincoop (2003). Haveman and Hummels note that total ex-
ports are likely to be a better measure of “economic mass” than GDP.
Gravity models are likely to be misspeciﬁed when bilateral exports grow
faster than GDP simply because total exports grow faster than GDP, not
because of some PTA eﬀect. The extent to which total exports grow faster
than GDP is an individual country eﬀect, not a country-pair eﬀect. Simi-
larly, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) note that in the correct theoreti-
cal speciﬁcation, bilateral trade ﬂows should depend on three measures of
trade barriers—the bilateral trade barrier between the two countries and
each country’s resistance to trade with all regions. Again, the two latter re-
sistance eﬀects are country eﬀects, not country-pair eﬀects.
It was not possible to test the sensitivity of the preceding Tobit speciﬁ-
cation to the inclusion of a country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects because there were
too many country-pair groups, preventing estimation. The approach also
risks overspeciﬁcation, with the country-pair eﬀects duplicating much of
the work of the PTA dummies.
A ﬁnal piece of sensitivity analysis is the inclusion of a lagged depend-
ent variable. Appropriate econometric estimation of such a speciﬁcation in
a Tobit context with ﬁxed eﬀects is unlikely to have been possible on a data
set of this size. In many other contexts, ordinary least squares (OLS) would
be an acceptable alternative to Tobit estimation in practice, with the results
not diﬀering greatly between the two estimation methods. Were this the
case here, it would have been possible to test sensitivity to the inclusion of
a lagged dependent variable in an OLS context. However, Tobit estimation
matters greatly here, as would be expected with 44 percent of the observa-
tions on the dependent variable being zero. The OLS estimation of the
original triple indexed speciﬁcation on the full sample (with zero export
values replaced by small positive numbers) led to results with a coeﬃcient
on the sum of GDPs being unreasonably low, at 0.555, and similar down-
ward  bias in other coeﬃcients, including those on distance, currency
union, and the PTA dummies. Thus the results of further sensitivity anal-
ysis on the OLS speciﬁcation were judged unreliable. For what it is worth,
adding a lagged dependent variable produced short-run coeﬃcients even
lower than the already low OLS estimates, while the value of the coeﬃcient
on the lagged dependent variable itself implied long-run coeﬃcients some-
what higher than the OLS estimates. In all other respects, the results were
unchanged.
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The observable eﬀects—normal bilateral investment determinants and
traditional and third-wave provisions of PTAs—and unobservable coun-
try- and time-speciﬁc eﬀects all signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the bilateral stock of
outward investment (see table 5.4).15
The signs of coeﬃcients on the normal bilateral investment determi-
nants are generally as expected. Larger absolute diﬀerences in per capita
GDP are associated with outward FDI being lower than otherwise. Be-
cause absolute diﬀerences in per capita GDP also boost bilateral exports,
the results lend some support to the idea that trade and FDI are substitutes
when trade is motivated by diﬀerences in factor endowments (Markusen
1983). Only if investment treaties are enacted between countries do they
have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on outward investment. When they are
signed but not enacted, they tend to suppress outward investment. The
presence of a currency union has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on outward FDI, al-
though it had a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on bilateral exports.
PTAs have been categorized in table 5.5 according to whether invest-
ment responds in either tariﬀ-jumping or beachhead fashion to the trade
provisions or whether it responds instead primarily to the nonmerchandise
trade provisions. A single PTA can fall into more than one category.
Only the South Paciﬁc Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation
Agreement (SPARTECA) and Andean agreements showed weak evidence
of investment behavior responding in beachhead fashion to the trade pro-
visions of the agreement. SPARTECA is a nonreciprocal agreement be-
tween Australia, New Zealand, and selected South Paciﬁc Island countries
with few nontrade provisions and with trade provisions only for selected
products. But the nonreciprocal tariﬀ preferences may have allowed the
Paciﬁc island countries to attract investment, not only from Australia and
New Zealand, but also from other countries, to gain preferential access to
the CER market.
Empirical evidence is weak for Ethier’s more general view that PTA
members can attract investment from nonmember countries, once other
observable and unobservable factors are controlled for. In four agreements
the trade provisions appear to have encouraged inward FDI from third
parties—the Andean Pact, SPARTECA, ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
(AFTA) and NAFTA—but in no case was the eﬀect signiﬁcant, and only
in the ﬁrst two agreements was the eﬀect also associated with an increase
in intrabloc trade (deﬁning beachhead investment). In three agreements,
it was the nontrade provisions that encouraged inward FDI from third
parties—NAFTA, EU, and SPARTECA—but only in the ﬁrst case was the
eﬀect signiﬁcant. Thus when a PTA had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on inward FDI
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15. The results in table 5.4 diﬀer slightly from those in earlier versions of this paper.Table 5.4 Gravity model of investment
Dynamic PTA indexes
Variable namec Without ﬁxedb With ﬁxeda,b
Ln sum of exporting and importing countries GDP (SUM) 1.496∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗
Similarity in exporting and importing country’s GDPs 0.086 –0.058
Ln of absolute diﬀerences in per capita GDPs of exporting 
and importing country –0.487∗∗ –0.603∗∗∗
Ln distance –0.682∗∗∗ –0.572∗∗∗
Ln bilateral real exchange rate 0.335∗∗ –0.242∗
Ln tariﬀ 0.013 0.001
Linguistic similarity 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Colonial 1.601∗∗∗ 1.285∗∗∗
Border 0.615∗∗ 0.595∗∗
Currency union –0.716 –1.162
Home country is an island –3.577∗∗∗ –3.212∗∗∗
Host country is an island –1.004∗∗∗ –1.174∗∗∗
Home country is landlocked –2.842∗∗∗ –3.122∗∗∗
Host country is landlocked 0.396 0.583∗∗
Investment treaties signed –1.525∗∗∗ –1.782∗∗∗

































F-EU2 2.136 0.795Table 5.4 (continued)
Dynamic PTA indexes









F-United States-Israel1 6.865 –8.098
F-United States-Israel2 –0.754 8.118
F-United States-Israel3 21.867∗ 54.425∗∗∗
LR  2 (chi2) 1,113.8 1,444.7
Log likelihood –2,192.9 –2,027.5
  (standard deviation of the error term) 1.875 1.609
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Notes: Dependent variable   Ln stock of outward investment; time period   1988–1997; unbalanced
panel; Tobit maximum likelihood estimates.
aTo save space, the ﬁxed eﬀect coeﬃcients associated with home country, host country, and time are not
reported here.
bSome PTA indexes are dropped because of high multicollinearity among explanatory variables.
c“M” before each PTA name denotes index of traditional merchandise trade provisions, and “F” before
each PTA name denotes index of new age provisions.
dWhile a Member Liberalization Index has not been calculated for APEC (a nonpreferential arrange-
ment), its possible eﬀects on the trade ﬂows of its members has been controlled for through a set of three
conventional zero-one dummy variables.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Table 5.5 Main drivers of investment in PTAs
No measurable  Tariﬀ-jumping eﬀects Beachhead  eﬀects Nontrade 
impact of trade provision of trade provisions provisions
MERCOSURa EFTA SPARTECAb Andean






aPTA indexes for these agreements were dropped because of high multicollinearity among the
explanatory variables.
bOnly weak evidence for this characterization because the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant.from third parties, it was in response to the nontrade rather than the trade
provisions. It appears that Ethier’s beachhead investment is not an impor-
tant phenomenon empirically.
The EFTA and CER agreements showed evidence of investment behav-
ior consistent with an unwinding of tariﬀ-jumping behavior. But both of
these agreements also showed signiﬁcant evidence of investment respond-
ing to the nontrade provisions of the agreement. A total of ﬁve of the nine
PTAs examined for investment eﬀects showed signiﬁcant evidence of in-
vestment responding to the nontrade provisions of the agreements.
While table 5.5 indicates investment responses to the traditional and
third-wave provisions of PTAs, it does not indicate whether PTAs caused
investment creation or investment diversion per se. A summary of the signs
of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients is reported in table 5.6.
As noted, the trade provisions of PTAs did not result in a signiﬁcant in-
crease in investment from nonmembers in any PTA. Trade provisions
caused a reduction in outward investment (investment diversion) in
SPARTECA but an increase in outward investment in EFTA and CER
consistent with the unwinding of tariﬀ-jumping investment.
The new age provisions in various PTAs have had a more widespread im-
pact on investment than the trade provisions. The NAFTA agreement was
estimated to have reduced investment among members. All other agree-
ments considered had no signiﬁcant eﬀects on investment among mem-
bers.
While NAFTA attracted investment from nonmembers, particularly
into Mexico, the new age provisions in the Andean Pact and EFTA were
unable to attract investment from nonmembers. For EFTA, the loss of
membership to EU made it a less attractive place for foreign direct invest-
ment. This is similar to the ﬁndings of Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland
(1995), who found that EC caused a diversion of third-country capital
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Table 5.6 New evidence on investment creation and diversion
Trade provisions Third-wave provisions
Extra-PTA Extra-PTA  Extra-PTA  Extra-PTA 
(inward) (outward) Intra-PTA (inward) (outward)
United States-Israel(–) EFTA( )N AFTA(–) Andean(–) Andean(–)
CER( ) EFTA(–) EFTA( )




Source: Table 5.4, signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
Note: Positive ( ) symbol denotes investment creation, and negative (–) symbol denotes investment di-
version.from EFTA to the EU. The Andean Pact was similarly aﬀected by the loss
of Peru, although the ﬁndings for Latin American countries are also af-
fected by incompleteness of the FDI outstock data.
The sum of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the indexes of third-wave provi-
sions for each PTA can provide an indicative measure of the impact of
these new age provisions on net investment creation (see table 5.7). Of the
nine PTAs examined for investment eﬀects, ﬁve showed positive net invest-
ment eﬀects. Only the Andean Pact caused net investment diversion. This
agreement apparently caused a reduction in both inward and outward in-
vestment with third parties, without succeeding in causing a signiﬁcant
boost in intrabloc investment. As noted, this result may in part reﬂect in-
completeness in the FDI outstock data for Latin America.
The North American Free Trade Agreement, EU, EFTA, CER, and the
US-Israel agreement caused net investment creation, not because they
stimulated investment among members, but primarily because they appear
to have stimulated outward investment from member to nonmember coun-
tries. This is consistent with some of the nontrade provisions of these
agreements being nonpreferential in nature. It is also consistent with some
of these regions being major sources of FDI, but this suggests that the es-
timated eﬀects may well reﬂect the inﬂuence of causal factors not con-
trolled for in the analysis that make these countries net capital exporters,
rather than the eﬀects of PTA formation and expansion per se. One ex-
ample is ﬁnancial deregulation and the growth of superannuation funds
that have encouraged Australia to become a much more important capital
exporter recently (Battellino 2002).
The South Paciﬁc Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agree-
ment had no signiﬁcant impact on net investment creation, while the
eﬀects of MERCOSUR and AFTA on investment could not be distin-
guished because of problems of multicollinearity.
Though the investment results appear to be more positive than the re-
sults reported for trade, there are number of qualiﬁcations that need to be
considered. Winters (1997) argued that new FDI from any source could go
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Table 5.7 Net impact of PTAs’ third-wave provisions on investment






Source: Table 5.4, ﬁxed eﬀects estimates, signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
aPTA indexes for these agreements were dropped because of high multicollinearity among the
explanatory variables.into the production of goods for trade diversion and thus worsen the PTA’s
welfare overall. In similar tone, McLaren (2002) argued that
A regional trade regime can plausibly be interpreted as a coordination
failure, in which the anticipation that the world will break into regional
trade blocs induces sunk private sector investments that then lead to a
demand for regionalism. Under this argument, regionalism can be
Pareto-worsening even though once sunk investments have been made it
is, ex post, a relatively eﬃcient compromise: hence, regionalism is “in-
sidious,” the damage it does to eﬃciency is hidden in the distortion of ex
ante investments. (McLaren 2002, 572)
The gravity model estimates provide indications of the positive net in-
vestment eﬀects of PTAs but do not consider whether the resulting invest-
ment contributes to trade diversion.
Further, as noted before, a ﬁnding of net investment creation is a weak
indicator of whether the welfare gains from investment creation outweigh
the costs of investment diversion. Investment diversion may dominate cre-
ation in welfare terms, even if it does not in “volume of investment” terms.
On the other hand, if the nontrade provisions reduce restrictions that raise
costs, member countries can gain in welfare terms, despite investment di-
version. But in either case, members could well gain even more from
multilateral liberalization of nontrade restrictions.
5.4 Summary
Theoretical work has always highlighted that while the merchandise
trade provisions of PTAs can boost trade among members, this is often at
the expense of nonmembers. So whether it beneﬁts a country to join a PTA
depends on the cost structures in partner countries, compared with the cost
structures in third parties. If a preferential trade arrangement diverts a
country’s imports from a low-cost third party to a higher-cost preferential
trade partner, it can be made worse oﬀ. Conversely, the opportunity for
beneﬁts is greater where the PTA partner is at world-best competitiveness
and where liberalization under the PTA encourages imports from that
source.
The new empirical work outlined in this paper suggests that of the eight-
een recent PTAs examined in detail, twelve have diverted more trade from
nonmembers than they have created among members. What is more, some
of the apparently quite liberal PTAs—including EU, NAFTA and
MERCOSUR—have failed to create signiﬁcant additional trade among
members (relative to the average trade changes registered among coun-
tries in the sample).
Part of the reason for this more negative ﬁnding than in previous studies
is the rigorous statistical test that has been applied to ascertain whether
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than before. In the past, this was assessed, at best, only by reference to the
point estimates from various cross sections. But the ﬁnding is also consis-
tent with the observation that many of the provisions needed in preferen-
tial arrangements to underpin and enforce their preferential nature—such
as rules of origin—are in practice quite trade restricting.
While the increasing focus of PTAs on nontrade provisions may suggest
that conventional concerns about trade diversion are outmoded, some the-
oretical literature suggests this conclusion would be premature.
On the one hand, in an increasingly integrated world economy, even mi-
nor trade concessions can have a signiﬁcant impact on investment ﬂows.
And if investment is attracted into one PTA partner in order to serve the
markets of the others, then the trade from such beachhead positions can
constitute traditional trade diversion.
On the other, the nontradeprovisions of PTAs, particularly those related
to investment and services, can also have a signiﬁcant impact on investment
ﬂows. But the preferential nature of the PTA provisions may mean that in-
vestment is diverted from a low-cost to a higher-cost host country, and
such investment diversion can also be harmful.
The empirical work in this paper ﬁnds little evidence of beachhead in-
vestment, or an unwinding of tariﬀ-jumping investment, in response to the
trade provisions of PTAs. Only for SPARTECA and the Andean Pact, for
example, is there (weak) evidence of FDI responding in beachhead fashion
to trade provisions. And only for EFTA and CER is there some evidence
of an unwinding of tariﬀ-jumping investment.
There is evidence that FDI responds signiﬁcantly to the nontrade pro-
visions of PTAs. And in ﬁve of the nine PTAs examined for investment
eﬀects, the nontrade provisions led to net investment creation.
Although it is a weak test, this suggests that on balance, the nontrade
provisions of these PTAs have created an eﬃcient geographic distribution
of FDI. This is consistent with the fact that at least some of the nontrade
provisions (e.g., commitments to more strongly enforce intellectual prop-
erty rights) are not strongly preferential in their nature.
Further, the theoretical literature has stressed that if the nontrade barri-
ers are of the sort to raise the real resource costs of doing business, rather
than simply to create rents that raise prices above costs, then preferential
liberalization will be beneﬁcial, even in the absence of net investment cre-
ation.
However, the trade that may be generated from the new FDI positions
may still be diverted in the wrong direction in response to the trade provi-
sions of PTAs and may therefore contribute to the net trade diversion also
found here.
Thus the results of this paper suggest that there may be economic gains
from the nontrade provisions of third-wave PTAs, but they also suggest
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the trade provisions. And these costs could be magniﬁed in a world of in-
creasing capital mobility.
Thus the ﬁndings of this research on the eﬀects of the nontrade provi-
sions of PTAs are more positive than those on the trade provisions. This
suggests there could be real beneﬁts if countries could use regional negoti-
ations to persuade trading partners to make progress in reforming such
things as investment, services, competition policy, and government pro-
curement, especially if this is done on a nonpreferential basis.
Appendix
The Static Welfare Eﬀects of PTAs
In ﬁgure 5A.1, Sa and Da are the domestic supply and demand curves in
country A. Sbis the supply curve of imports from the PTA partner country,
showing that any quantity can be supplied from there at the price P b. Sw is
the supply curve of imports from the rest of the world, showing that any
quantity can be supplied from there at price P w. P∗
a is the initial, tariﬀ-
inﬂated price in country A, with the tariﬀtequal to P∗
a– P w. Initially all im-
ports Qc – Qp come from the rest of the world, as with the same tariﬀ t
placed on imports from B, the local price in country A would exceed P∗
a.
The tariﬀ revenue on the imports from the rest of the world is AEJF. The
quantity produced domestically is Qp, and domestic consumption is Qc.
Now suppose that country A eliminates its tariﬀ on imports from B but
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Fig. 5A.1 An illustration of trade creation and diversion eﬀects of a PTAretains it on imports from the rest of the world. With imports now available
from Bat P b, the import quantity expands to Q  c– Q  p, with country Brather
than the rest of the world becoming the source. Tariﬀ revenue shrinks to
zero. Domestic production shrinks to Q  p, and domestic consumption ex-
pands to Q  c.
The net eﬀect of PTA formation on economic well-being in country A is
given by ABC   FGH – BEJG. The ﬁrst eﬀect, the gain of ABC   FGH, is
the net beneﬁt to consumers and the net resource saving in production
from having domestic production shrink from Qp to Q  p and consumption
expand from Qc to Q  c. This is the trade creation gain from shifting high-
cost domestic production to a lower-cost partner.16 The second eﬀect, the
loss of BEJG, is that portion of the tariﬀ revenue lost by shifting imports
from the rest of the world to the higher-cost partner that is not recouped in
lower domestic prices to consumers. It is the welfare loss from trade diver-
sion and arises essentially because forgone domestic tariﬀ revenue accrues
instead as proﬁt to producers in the partner country. The eﬀect on country
Ais ambiguous a priori. Strictly speaking, only if the partner country is al-
ready at world-best production cost is a welfare gain to countryA assured.
But then A’s economic motive for preferential rather than nondiscrimina-
tory trade liberalization is unclear.
What about the welfare eﬀects on the country receiving the preferential
tariﬀconcession and the eﬀects on the rest of the world? Both face a change
in demand for their product from country A, but because of the assump-
tion of constant costs, there is no induced change in unit costs that can ﬂow
on to beneﬁt domestic consumers or drive an improvement in resource
allocation in those countries.17 Thus, the eﬀect on country A, the country
granting the tariﬀ preference, is the same as the welfare eﬀect on the PTA
and the world as a whole. This highlights one of the key weaknesses of the
simple analysis—its assumption of constant costs of production in the
partner country and in the rest of the world.
The simple analysis is nevertheless useful for outlining the nature of
empirical tests for trade creation and trade diversion. Typically, these tests
measure the amount by which the volume (or more often, the value) of
trade increases with partner countries—Q  c – Q  p in the preceding ex-
ample—and compare it with the amount by which trade with the rest of the
world is reduced—Qc– Qpin the preceding example. If the net eﬀect is pos-
itive, it is still only a weak test of whether the gains from trade creation
outweigh the costs of trade diversion. It establishes that there is some pos-
The Trade and Investment Eﬀects of Preferential Trading Arrangements 165
16. Viner’s (1950) original analysis omitted the consumption gain FGH. Johnson (1960)
was the ﬁrst to include it as part of the gains from trade creation, thereby ending unproduc-
tive debates about the possibility of welfare-increasing trade diversion (Gehrels 1957; Lipsey
1957; Michaely 1976).
17. If there is a preexisting distortion in the exporting sector of the exporting country, then
an expansion of that sector could worsen the allocation of resources.itive width to the triangles ABC and FGH, but it does not establish that
their areas exceed that of BEJG. This also depends on the reduction in
costs per unit of newly created trade and the increase in costs per unit of di-
verted trade. What can be concluded in this model is that if the empirical
tests establish net trade creation in a volume or value sense, then the PTA
may still have generated welfare losses, but if the empirical tests establish
net trade diversion, then the PTA cannot have created welfare gains.
The assumption of constant costs in the partner country and in the rest
of the world is consistent with perfect competition in those two markets.
There has been a great deal of analysis examining the welfare eﬀects of al-
lowing unit production costs to vary in those two markets (see Panagariya
[2000] for a summary), although the analysis has not always been explicit
about the nature or source of the less-than-perfect competition in those
markets.
The easiest way to see the dramatic eﬀects that less-than-perfect compe-
tition can have is to imagine in ﬁgure 5A.1 that the producers in country B
form a cartel and price up to the world price plus external tariﬀ after they
are granted the tariﬀpreference. Their price would remain at P∗
a, the losses
to country Afrom trade diversion would expand to AEJF, and the gains to
A from trade creation would disappear completely! On the other hand,
country B would now have a net gain in rent of ABGF that was previously
tariﬀ revenue accruing to A. The net loss to the PTA and the world as a
whole would be BEGJ. Thus, less-than-perfect competition can preserve
the losses from trade diversion but destroy the gains from trade creation.
One of the most general treatments of less-than-perfect competition is
by Mundell (1964). He draws the following conclusions on the eﬀects of a
customs union, assuming that all goods are gross substitutes and initial
tariﬀs are low:
(1) The discriminatory tariﬀreduction by a member country improves
the terms of trade of the partner country with respect to both the tariﬀ
reducing country and the rest of the world, but the terms of trade of the
tariﬀ-reducing country might rise or fall with respect to third countries.
(2) The degree of improvement in the terms of trade of the partner
country is likely to be larger the greater is the member’s tariﬀ reduction;
this establishes the presumption that a member’s gain from a free-trade
area will be larger the higher are initial tariﬀs of partner countries.
(Mundell 1964, 8)
A key to this result is the revenue transfer eﬀect that can arise with less-
than-perfect competition. It is also the basis for Panagariya’s (1999) con-
clusion, for example, that the United States is likely to gain, but that Mex-
ico could lose, from NAFTA.
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Comment Bih Jane Liu
The number of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) has grown dra-
matically over the last decade or so. How PTAs aﬀect the trade and invest-
ment among member countries and between member and nonmember
countries thus becomes a very important issue nowadays. This paper, focus-
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Bih Jane Liu is professor of economics at National Taiwan University.ing on this important issue, is very comprehensive and well written. It not
only surveys the related theoretical and empirical literature thoroughly, but
it also has done a great job in collecting the data and doing the econometric
analysis. By using a gravity model to examine eighteen PTAs over the period
of 1970–1997, this paper shows that most of the PTAs, including the Euro-
pean Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), have diverted more
trade from nonmember countries than they have created among member
countries. In addition, it shows that for most of the agreements where non-
trade provisions have aﬀected foreign direct investment (FDI), the PTAs
eﬀects have been investment creation rather than diversion.
Although I agree with most of the points that the authors made in this
paper, as a discussant I would like to raise some questions.
The ﬁrst question is related to model speciﬁcation. This paper uses PTA
variables and many country-speciﬁc variables to capture the trade rela-
tionship among countries. Thus the usual problem of omitted-variable bias
in gravity models could be avoided to a certain degree. However, the com-
plicated heterogeneity relationship among member countries and between
member and nonmember countries still could not be completely captured
by these two kinds of variables, for example, if there are three countries, A,
B, and C, in the same trading bloc. Aand Bare natural partners, but Aand
C are not. Apparently, the trade creation and diversion eﬀects between A
and B would be diﬀerent from that between A and C. In this case the PTA
variables could not be used to diﬀerentiate the diﬀerent trade eﬀect be-
tween A and B and A and C. The question then is whether the features of
heterogeneity can be captured by the variables such as GDP, real exchange
rate, distance, country dummies, linguistic similarity, and so on? To me, the
answer seems unclear. Moreover, to derive trade creation or trade diversion
eﬀects, the inclusion of PTA dummies in the gravity equation may not be
suﬃcient. This is because PTA dummies reveal little about cost of produc-
tion across diﬀerent countries. Some variables related to wage or cost of
production and/or the cross terms of these variables with PTA dummies
may be needed to understand whether trade from lower-cost PTA members
can be created and whether trade is diverted from lower-cost PTA non-
members to higher-cost PTA members after a trading bloc is formed.
The second question has something to do with the endogeneity problem.
We all know that GDP, GDP per capita, and the real exchange rate are
endogeneous variables that should be determined simultaneously with ex-
ports (the dependent variable) within the model. However, in this paper
these endogeneous variables are used as the right-hand-side variables in
the gravity equation (1). As a result, the error term in equation (1) will be
correlated with them, and hence the estimators will be biased. To avoid the
endogeneity problem, I would suggest that the authors use lag variables or
to run simultaneous equations.
The Trade and Investment Eﬀects of Preferential Trading Arrangements 171This paper utilizes the panel data for the period of 1970–1997 to exam-
ine eighteen PTAs. While it achieves maximum degree of freedom, I am
wondering whether the results thus obtained will suﬀer from subsample in-
stability and heteroskedasticity. This is because the relationship between
exports and country-speciﬁc factors may vary across diﬀerent trading
blocs. A sensitivity analysis may serve to make sure that the results are ro-
bust even for subsamples or subperiod samples.
Past studies showed that most PTAs are trade creating in net terms. By
contrast, the results from this paper suggest that most PTAs do not create
additional trade, either for members or for nonmembers of the agreements.
I suspect that it has something to do with the induced investment eﬀect. If
PTAs have signiﬁcant investment creation eﬀect as shown in this paper,
then this new investment may be either a substitute for or a complement of
trade and will hence aﬀect trade ﬂows indirectly. In the case where invest-
ment creation does substitute for intraregional trade, we may observe neg-
ative trade creation as shown in this paper. To show whether negative trade
eﬀect is indeed caused by investment, I would suggest that the authors run
trade and investment equations simultaneously with each variable appear-
ing in the other equation. By doing so, we are able to better understand the
interrelationship between trade and investment under PTAs.
One last point is that the wave of globalization together with a reduction
in transport costs and an improvement in communication and technol-
ogies all make outward direct investment and foreign outsourcing become
more prevalent in the 1990s. This in turn changes the nature of interna-
tional trade from trade in ﬁnal goods to trade in intermediate inputs. Be-
cause the empirical data in this paper cover the time period from 1970
through 1997, how this change in trade structure should be taken into ac-
count in the study of the impacts of PTAs will also deserve special atten-
tion.
Comment Erlinda Medalla
First of all, let me say that I really enjoyed reading Philippa Dee and Jyothi
Gali’s paper. The primary reason I chose to discuss this paper is because I
wanted to get reacquainted with the topic and get on track with the litera-
ture. And on this, the paper does an excellent job.
The paper is very provocative.
I cannot fault the logic (how arguments are developed).
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Erlinda Medalla is a senior research fellow of the Philippine Institute for Development
Studies.But to me, there are some jarring notes and conclusions. And I admit
there is still a lot I don’t completely understand.
My comments come from these two reactions I had, which could be
interrelated. Conclusions jar in my mind because I probably did not com-
pletely understand the matter.
Hopefully, my comments will help the paper become more understand-
able to people less technical in orientation and to people who have not
done work and are not familiar with the intricacies of the topic.
The Member Liberalization Index
I am not clear on how is it actually estimated. My understanding is that
it reﬂects the coverage of the provisions of the preferential trading ar-
rangement (PTA) (whether or not they are used).
The paper mentions that a high index indicates that the PTA is more lib-
eral to members in the particular area covered by the provisions of the
PTA. In nonmerchandise trade, if this is among the provisions of the PTA
and its share in total trade is x percent, then I take it that this is the value it
takes. (If this is close enough, then my subsequent reading and under-
standing of the analysis would not be too erroneous.) Nonetheless, I think
the authors need to explain this further.
The Gravity Model
I appreciate the distinction made between ex ante CGE analysis and the
ex post technique of the gravity model. I think both have merits.
The merit of the gravity model, as mentioned, is that it is ex post and ex-
amines actual PTA. The shortcoming is that it only looks at links between
the PTA formation and trade outcomes.
My own bias is that simply looking at trade outcomes is very limiting.
Judging the beneﬁts merely based on trade eﬀects (whether trade creating
or trade diverting) is not enough. As the paper says, there is weak linkage
between trade and welfare. And this is precisely what we want to look at
when we want to assess if a PTA is beneﬁcial or not.
This is one of the jarring notes I was referring to earlier. Looking at trade
diversion and trade creation is based mainly on a static model explained in
the appendix. It is not only static, it is also just a (very) partial analysis.
When domestic production contracts because of the PTA, the gain is not
only the reduction in the former deadweight loss. The additional gain is the
resources this releases (maybe not all because of sunk costs) to relatively
more proﬁtable activities. The resulting less-distorted relative prices (as, in
eﬀect, the relative prices facing producers with the higher tariﬀfor all trad-
ing partners result in higher relative domestic prices of importables) with
PTA would mean a better resource allocation, at least from the point of
view of the individual member country.
The Trade and Investment Eﬀects of Preferential Trading Arrangements 173Nonetheless, it is always good to look at a number of approaches but
keep in mind their particular limitations.
The Speciﬁcations of the Model
It was a bit diﬃcult to ﬁgure out. I had to read it several times to under-
stand why it is that the dependent variable is exports from country i to j.
Was there another speciﬁcation that uses imports of country i from coun-
try j ? If not, I thought the authors also wanted to measure import diver-
sion? Or are they all mixed together (y is really either export or import).
Then I ﬁgure that we are dealing with a comprehensive set of data, such
that a bilateral export to one is bilateral imports of another? It would help
if there is more explanation of this at the outset.
In the explanatory variables, why use the sum of GDP and then the ab-
solute diﬀerence rather than use directly separate GDPs of the partner
countries? Connected to this, should there be an overall activity level vari-
able, for example, world GDP (or GDP of the ROW)?
The three dummy variables used for each PTA have not been easy to
follow and visualize because of the large sample of countries. The ﬁrst
dummy is easier to understand. It takes on the value of the MLI for exports
where the bilateral ﬂow is between countries with a PTA, say for exports
from Australia to New Zealand, with Closer Economic Relations (CER).
Hence, CER1 is the corresponding MLI. In addition, I understand CER2
and CER3 are zero. (Am I right?) For exports involving two countries out-
side this particular PTA (say exports from Thailand to the Philippines, not
members of CER), the three dummies are zero (all CER dummies are
zero), but if they have their own PTA (e.g., AFTA), there needs to be an ad-
ditional three dummies, the ﬁrst of which will be MLI (AFTA1 dummy
value is MLI). Furthermore, for exports from Australia (of CER) to, say,
Thailand (of AFTA), then AFTA2 is MLI related to AFTA. And ﬁnally,
for exports from Thailand to Australia, CER3 is MLI related to CER. (Did
I understand it correctly?) This is really complicated, and I congratulate
the eﬀort there must have been in dealing with such a huge amount of ob-
servations involving numerous variables.
I needed to understand this clearly in order to understand the meaning
of the coeﬃcients of the three dummies and why they capture intrabloc
trade and import and export diversion, which brings me to my next com-
ment. What is the impact of using MLI rather than zeroes and ones? And
in separating exports and imports, does this not introduce an upward bias
on trade diversion? (Because standard deviation for the sum adds up.) In
the ﬁrst place, is this the interpretation, simply summing up the coeﬃcients
to get the net trade eﬀects? I deduced this from the explanation in the case
of Frankel (1997), who uses only two dummies. Is my interpretation cor-
rect?
The paper made, toward the end, a qualiﬁcation on the results about the
174 Philippa Dee and Jyothi Galiintra-PTA eﬀect having large standard error, compared to the extra-PTA
eﬀect, which is estimated more accurately. Doesn’t this pose a serious lim-
itation? How robust will the estimate be on the net?
Finally, the paper later mentioned (when discussing investments) that
because of model convergence problems, the eﬀects of new age provisions
on exports to and imports from nonmembers could not be analyzed sepa-
rately. Does the author have some a priori notions about the direction of
eﬀects?
On Investments
I have similar misgivings on this as in the previous analysis on trade out-
comes. 
Instead of exports, it uses stock of outward investment. Isn’t ﬂow the
more appropriate variable? (I thought ﬂow is easier to measure than stock.)
Accepting this, why outward, not inward, FDI? I would think that for a
member country, this is what is important to ﬁnd out. Again, I may just be
missing something here. They are just two sides of the same coin. But us-
ing inward FDI would have had more intuitive appeal. It would help if the
authors explain why (even in a footnote), as it was not readily obvious to
me and possibly to other readers as well (especially nontechnical ones who
I think this paper is important to reach).
I tend to share Ethier’s (2001) arguments that there is likely “beachhead”
response from nonmember countries on FDI. I also agree that some in-
vestments could be lost from tariﬀ-jumping-motivated investments. How-
ever, in this age of reduced trade barriers, how much of these are left?
Finally, whether there is investment diversion or not, I think the receiv-
ing country would always gain (although there may be a reduction in
global welfare).
On the whole, I would like to congratulate the authors for such an excel-
lent paper. I learned a lot from it, and it has inspired me to study it more.
It was well thought out and well written.
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